BOOK REVIEW
A Political Scientist Examines the Washington
Supreme Court:
A CENTURY OF JUDGING: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE WASHINGTON
SUPREME COURT Charles H. Sheldont
Seattle, WA: The University of Washington
Press, 1988. Pp. 379. $35.00
Reviewed by Deborah Dowd*
Charles H. Sheldon asks two major questions in his recent
book, A CENTURY OF JUDGING. 1 Sheldon asks, first, about the

multiple forces that shape the judicial recruitment process in
the State of Washington. Sheldon asks, second, about how
these and other forces influence judicial decision making.2 In
answering these questions, Sheldon focuses on the Washington
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the information gathered and
analyzed is of more interest to political scientists or historians
than to practicing lawyers. Lawyers should be knowledgeable
about the judges before whom they may argue a case.3 Yet, the
t Charles H. Sheldon is a Professor of Political Science at Washington State
University, Pullman.
* Deborah Dowd is a member of the Legal Writing faculty at the University of
Puget Sound School of Law and a member of the Washington State Bar Association.
1. SHELDON, A CENTURY OF JUDGING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE WASHINGTON
SUPREME COURT (1988) [hereinafter A CENTURY OF JUDGING]. Professor Sheldon

presents his research through extensive tables, charts, graphs, and surveys of
participants in the process, such as law clerks and justices.
2. The power of judicial review is identified as another source of tension in the
process. However, this factor is not examined in depth. A CENTURY OF JUDGING,
supra note 1, at 19-20, 214.
3. An advocate should be interested in gathering as much information as possible
about the judges who will decide the case.
The advocate will find out all he can about the individual judges who will
decide his case: what they may have written in opinions or public statements;
what has been their education, their prior professional experience, their

324

'University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 12:323

methodology and data utilized in A CENTURY OF JUDGING do
not create a cohesive picture of the supreme court justices,
either collectively or individually. The book compiles useful
information; however, the answers to the two questions posed
and the relationship between the underlying facts and the
theories are inconclusive.
To identify the multiple forces that mold the judicial
recruitment process, Sheldon first establishes a general
framework. This framework accounts for the two types of
recruitment in Washington. The first avenue to the bench is
through the electoral process. The second is by gubernatorial
appointment to fill a new position or temporary vacancy.
These two methods of recruitment are divided into three
stages: initiation, screening, and affirmation.4 Sheldon then
examines elections and appointments from the territorial
period through 1986, organizing the discussion around five
distinct historical periods: 1889-1912; 1912-32; 1933-49; 1949-69;
and 1969-86. He traces the ebb and flow of power exerted by
political parties, governors, voters, lawyers' organizations, and
other interested participants, such as labor groups.5
Sheldon suggests a theoretical explanation for the
multiple forces operating on the judicial recruitment process.
Because our form of government is democratic, society
religious and political affiliations, their hobbies and interests; what other
lawyers who know them have to say about them.... It may not affect the
logical progression of his argument, but it may influence what he chooses to
highlight or emphasize.
G. PECK, WRITING PERSUASIVE BRIEFS 76 (1984). Although A CENTURY OF JUDGING
provides a great deal of factual material about the supreme court, it fails to draw this
information together into a coherent picture that would be useful for a practitioner.
4. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3 states in pertinent part as follows:
The judges of the supreme court shall be elected by the qualified electors of
the state at large at the general state election at the times and places at which
state officers are elected.... If a vacancy occurs in the office of a judge of the
supreme court the governor shall appoint a person to hold the office until the
election and qualification of a judge to fill the vacancy, which election shall
take place at the next succeeding general election, and the judge so elected
shall hold the office for the remainder of the unexpired term.
Thus, throughout A CENTURY OF JUDGING, three separate sets of participants and two
separate recruitment methods are discussed. The actors include the electorate, the governor, and all groups trying to influence these two primary decision makers. The
recruitment methods are either election to a full term or gubernatorial appointment to
fill a new or temporarily vacant supreme court position. A CENTURY OF JUDGING,
supra note 1, at 31-32 (Tables 2.1 & 2.2).
5. Ultimately, Sheldon concludes that judicial decision making is affected by a
shifting balance among pluralistic forces. Id. at 11.
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requires that judges be accountable to the public. 6 The public

should be able to examine the actions of those who make
public policy, as judges do when they resolve disputes between
litigants.7 This idea of public accountability conflicts with
what Sheldon denominates judicial independence. Judges, in
reaching decisions, are expected to remain aloof from the
litigants and the interests they represent. Judicial
independence is preserved by the passivity and obscurity of the
judicial role. For example, while lawyers initiate cases and
advocate their client's positions, judges are neutral decision
makers, who wait for cases to be brought to them for decision.
The supreme court's internal decisional process is obscure and
private; the public has access only to oral arguments and
written opinions.
A heavy emphasis was placed on public accountability
during the early period when political parties dominated the
judicial recruitment process. But, as judicial recruitment
evolved so that more groups participated in the process, the
emphasis shifted. Sheldon concludes that Washington's present
nonpartisan electoral process represents an effort to balance
the conflicting demands of public accountability and judicial
independence.'
The

bulk

of

A CENTURY

OF JUDGING

narrates

the

developments that led to the present system of nonpartisan
elections. During the early historical period, partisan politics
dominated all three stages of the recruitment process. Thus,
political parties initiated and screened candidates, and the
6. The importance of the democratic form of government is illustrated by the
decision, made in 1889, to elect Washington's Supreme Court justices rather than, for
example, appointing them for life. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Sheldon identifies three
influences leading to this method of selection. First, Jacksonian democracy
emphasized the people's ability to run government and to select representatives.
Second, the lawyers, who dominated the judiciary committees at the Washington
Constitutional Convention, thought that an election procedure would give the judges a

constituency, which would make the judiciary as powerful as the executive and
legislative branches. Third, the election method was a reaction to the territorial
system under which judges from other areas of the country were appointed to serve in
the territory. These judges were often absent from the state. A CENTURY OF JUDGING,

supra note 1, at 22-23.
7. Justices are also made accountable because decisions of the supreme court must
be in writing with the grounds for the decision stated, WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 2;
because the chief judgeship rotates on a biannual basis, WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3; and
because judges can be removed from office by impeachment, by a joint resolution of
the legislature, or by reaching the mandatory retirement age of 75, WASH. CONST. art.
V, § 2; Id. art. IV, §§ 3(a), 9.
8. A CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 1, at 8.
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electorate cast its votes based on the candidate's political
affiliations. Partisan involvement benefited judicial candidates
by providing them with campaign funds and with a means of
reaching the voters through political rallies.' Other groups,
such as the organized bar, were unsuccessful participants in
the recruitment process.' °
After 1910, when the nominating convention and the party
ballot were replaced by the direct primary and the nonpartisan
judicial ballot, political parties were less important in the
judicial recruitment process." Although judicial candidates
lost a ready source of funding and an easy means of voter
identification, they were freed from accountability to political
parties. As the influence of political parties waned and the
candidates had to manage and fund their own campaigns,
lawyers and their organizations gradually became more
active.' 2 Lawyers organized and conducted campaigns, publicly
announced which candidates they supported, and directly
contacted clients to urge a particular candidate's qualifications.
Lawyers also allowed their names to be used as endorsements
in political advertisements.
As early as 1908, the Seattle Bar began a primitive form of
bar poll to rate the candidates. The results were publicized on
the radio and in the newspapers. In fact, these judicial
preference polls became so important that candidates sought to
influence the results by contacting lawyers before the polling. 3
9. Id. at 51-52.

10. The organized bar adopted three approaches in its efforts to influence
judicial recruitment during the inaugural years [1889-1912]. Initially, the
profession worked toward removing the selection of judicial candidates from
nominating conventions and elections dominated by the political parties.
Nonpartisanship was the attorneys' goal. Once achieved in 1907, the
profession turned to the elimination of the direct primary as the means of

nominating judges. Finally, after a reluctant acceptance of the direct primary,
the organized profession devised means to influence both the governor when
he filled vacancies and the electorate as it retained or replaced judges on the
bench.
Id. at 61.

11. Id. at 51, 67.
12. Id. at 69.
13. Id. at 139. Lawyers' endorsements in candidates' advertisements must have
influenced the voters. In 1950, Hugh Rosellini, who lacked the support of the
established bar, told voters in his advertisements that he had avoided soliciting
endorsements because he did not want any lawyers to feel obligated to him, nor he to
them. Id. at 143. In 1958, the state bar association prohibited lawyers from lending
their endorsements to judicial candidates, seeing this practice as a possible violation of
Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. That Canon stated that a request for an
endorsement subjected practitioners to undue pressure because it may put them in the
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By 1924, some bar associations also had standing committees on
the selection of judges.
The bar became an increasingly powerful force with the
public and the legislature when, in 1933, Washington was one
of the first states to institute a unified bar, making
membership in the state bar organization compulsory. 4 The
bar association previously had adopted the American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics. Canon II, which
outlined a lawyer's duty to assist qualified judicial candidates
to be appointed or elected, was interpreted to require active
participation in the selection of judges."5 City and county bars,
working independently of the state organization, also actively
process, primarily by attempting to
participated in the election
16
influence the voters.
Despite their increasing influence, lawyers made several
efforts to change Washington's system of judicial recruitment.
In 1934, the American Judicature Society had espoused a
commission plan for selecting judges.'7 The plan had several
versions. Under one version, a nominating commission made
up of lawyers, judges, and lay persons would have compiled a
list of three candidates. The governor would have appointed
judges from this list. The voters would then have been asked
to approve the choice and, if they did not, the process would
have begun again. The commission plan was appealing to
lawyer organizations because it would have removed the public
from the recruitment process, and the governor would no
longer have been solely responsible for appointments. The
organized bar tried several times to propose a constitutional
position of offending the judge before whom they are practicing. In 1959, the state bar
lifted the prohibition on endorsements, but the candidate could not personally solicit

funds or endorsements. Id. at 148-49.
14. Id. at 103.
15. Id. at 73 n.17.
16. Id. at 106. The ability of lawyers and lawyers' organizations to influence voters
is illustrated by Justice Millard's unsuccessful bid for reelection in 1948. During 1946
and 1947, the court heard a highly controversial case regarding the purchase of a large,
private power company by the Skagit County Public Utility District. The justices voted

four-to-four, and Millard's vote was needed to break the deadlock. Millard delayed
over three months despite public criticism from his colleagues and the affected groups.
Subsequently, it was learned that Millard was in debt and had borrowed from persons
who were indirectly involved in litigation before the court; rumors of bribes in the
utility case also circulated. Millard was defeated in the next election partly because of

the Seattle Bar's judicial preference poll. Id. at 117-22.
17. Id. at 103-05.
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amendment to establish the commission plan.' 8 But, as the
governor began regularly to ask the bar organizations to screen
and recommend candidates, enthusiasm for the amendment
waned.
Sheldon also narrates the historical development of the
gubernatorial appointment process, the second type of judicial
recruitment. He notes that the governor was inactive' 9 during
the period when partisan political forces were dominant. The
governor merely filled new or temporary vacancies, usually
responding to the number and prestige of a candidate's
endorsements and his or her geographical connections and
party affiliation. As political parties became less important,
lawyers and lawyer organizations sought to influence the
gubernatorial recruitment process. However, the success of the
arrangement depended on each governor's willingness to
consult with the bar organizations.
Under the present system for gubernatorial appointments,
the bar association works informally with the governor to
choose and screen potential candidates for appointment. The
bar association and its committee also evaluate candidates
suggested by the governor. Information about potential
candidates comes from committee members' personal
knowledge, from questionnaires sent to the candidates, and
from candidate interviews.20 The book does not describe the
criteria that the bar committee uses in its selection and
screening process. However, the committee does accommodate
the governor's criteria for selecting appointees. These criteria
are political party affiliation, political experience, geographical
connections, and electability. 1 Sheldon concludes that the
relationship between the governor and the organized bar,
although informal, has reciprocal advantages. The bar needs
the governor's willingness to use the committee, while the
18. Some form of the commission plan was introduced in the legislature as late as

1975. Id. at 151, 189-90.
19. Id. at 52, 59-60. "Although the appointment process was initially intended to
complement elections by providing a quick means of filling interim vacancies, it has
taken on a significance not intended by the founders." Id. at 36.
20. A CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 1, at 156 n.9.

21. For example, in the September 1988 primaries, all four of the justices who
were running for reelection were unopposed. Justices Brachtenbach, Pearson, Utter,

and Dolliver had all initially become justices through gubernatorial appointment.
Thus, they had the name familiarity so important to voters. See A CENTURY OF
JUDGING, supra note 1, at 162 (Table 7.2).
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governor needs the bar's expert advice and legitimation of the
process.
In summarizing the present institutionalized system,
Sheldon concludes that, except in gubernatorial appointments,
partisan influences have lessened while the unified bar
association and other lawyer groups have become more
powerful. Additionally, the electorate participates more in
judicial selection and is more knowledgeable about the
candidates.2 2 In elections, the governor's support has become
increasingly important because incumbents who have been
appointed are more often reaffirmed than replaced when they
stand for election.23 The electorate is also guided by
endorsements, the candidate's name familiarity, and the results
of bar preference polls.
The suggestion that the public is now more knowledgeable
about judicial candidates is contradicted by the historical
narrative and by the evidence gathered in the first portion of A
CENTURY OF JUDGING. These suggest that the electorate is no

better informed about judicial candidates than it was during
the period of partisan politics when most voters selected a
candidate based on political party affiliation. Instead, voters
still look to identifiable interest groups for guidance; but, the
composition of the groups has changed. For example, voters
respond to the results of bar association preference polls. They
are also guided by endorsements or by gubernatorial
appointments. Polls, endorsements, and appointments have
merely replaced political party affiliation.
The public's lack of knowledge is illustrated by the process
for selecting and screening candidates for gubernatorial
appointment, much of which is secret.24 For example, the
22. Id. at 196.
23. Id.
24. Members of the bar association's Judicial Selection Committee were concerned
about maintaining anonymity so that persons contacted for information about possible
candidates would be frank and so that the public would not be influenced by knowing
which candidates had been rejected or chosen. Id. at 155 n.7. This emphasis on secrecy

is unfortunate because, frequently, judges appointed by the governor have the
necessary support and name familiarity to win an election. In the September 1988
primaries, all four justices who were running for reelection were unopposed. All four
of them, Justices Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Utter, and Pearson, had originally been
appointed by a governor. Id. at 166-68, 171, 179, 182. Thus, the electorate, which is
given the constitutional power to select judges, is forced to make uninformed decisions.
The problem is exacerbated by the Judicial Qualifications Commission's decisions
to refuse to investigate or consider conduct before a judge assumed his or her position
and to keep its deliberations private. See, e.g., Seattle Times, Sept. 20, 1988, at B1; Id.,
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committees that Sheldon contacted for information about how
the recommendations for gubernatorial appointments were
made were reluctant to describe the process. Those
committees were afraid of improperly influencing the public
by disclosing which candidates had been considered or rejected.
They were also concerned about the difficulty of obtaining
accurate information about a candidate if an informant's
identity might be revealed.
In the same way, investigations of a judge's conduct while
he or she is on the bench are usually closed to the public.
Thus, the public may not know that a candidate for reelection
has been investigated for misconduct or, perhaps, privately
reprimanded for improper actions.
This lack of public participation and information
undermines the theory that public accountability is a
motivating factor in judicial recruitment. Sheldon had posited
that, as the process evolves, a balance is reached between the
conflicting demands of public accountability and judicial
independence. After he concludes the historical narrative, he
reassesses this theory with a survey.2 5 The survey measured
responses to four possible functions for judicial elections. At
one end of the spectrum, judges act as the public's delegates
and remain accountable to the voters. At the other end of the
spectrum, judges are trustees, who are to be relied upon to do
their best without interference from the public. The third
view, a middle position, perceives judges as stewards. Elections
keep these stewards in touch with the public and make the
judges sensitive to its interests. The fourth viewpoint, also a
halfway position, sees elections as a means of recalling judges
who are not performing according to the public's expectations.
Summarizing the results, Sheldon concludes that elections
are seen as primarily serving a stewardship function.
Secondarily, elections are seen as a device for removing judges
Oct. 3, 1988, at B1. The practical effect of the screening process, then, is to force the
electorate to make uneducated guesses about judicial candidates. In addition, elections
do not serve the removal function, which Professor Sheldon's survey suggested was
the second purpose of elections, because the electorate has no information about the
misconduct of judges while they are in office.
25. A CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 1, at 194. Data was gathered from a 1982
survey of registered voters in jurisdictions having at least one contested judicial
election, a survey of lawyers in Seattle, Bellevue, and Stevens County, and all
candidates for judicial office throughout the state. Id. at 193-94 nn. 57 & 61 (Table 7.6
at 196).
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whose performance is unacceptable.2 6 The results of the
survey are presented to support the theory that the process by
which judges are selected in Washington reflects a middle
judicial
and
accountability
public
between
ground
However, the survey merely tests the
independence.
perceived role of the electorate. It does not measure the forces
that manipulate the electorate into making particular choices.
Nor does A CENTURY OF JUDGING present an example of a

situation in which public accountability and judicial
independence conflict. Thus, the information that has been
gathered and analyzed does not prove the theory.
The

last

part of

A CENTURY

OF JUDGING

explores

Sheldon's second question: what forces influence the supreme
court's decision making? Sheldon suggests that there are a
multitude of factors that affect judicial decision making. These
include the recruitment process described in the first part of
the book, the backgrounds and personal beliefs of individual
justices, the historical changes in the kinds of legal questions
presented for decision, and the interplay of institutional
factors.28 Sheldon theorizes that all of these forces must be
balanced if the court is to achieve the goals of effectiveness,
cohesiveness, and equilibrium, which will enable it to function
29
as a viable entity.
26. Id. at 196.
27. Id. at 9-11, 242-43.
28. Id. at 241. Professor Sheldon states one of his main theses as follows: "To
understand why persons with certain attitudes have survived a particular version of
the recruitment process is to understand to a significant degree why the person, after
becoming a judge, chose one of several viable decisional alternatives in resolving a
legal dispute." Id. at 28, 337.
29. Two elements comprise the measure of a court's effectiveness: expeditiousness
and thoroughness. Expeditiousness includes the time taken to render a decision and
the number of decisions rendered. Thoroughness assesses the reasons and
explanations given in support of a decision. Professor Sheldon measured the
expeditiousness of the representative courts by examining the average amount of time
between the trial court's decision, or if the case was directly appealed, the court of
appeals' decision, and the date on which the supreme court rendered its decision.
Thoroughness was measured by examining the number of pages in a written decision,
the number of majority opinions, and the number of en banc, as opposed to
departmental, decisions reached. Professor Sheldon assumed that longer opinions
suggested that the writer and the justices who joined in the opinion had been more
thorough. Id. at 245-46 (Table 10.2).

Cohesiveness measures the degree of reconciliation between the individual and
collective phases of judicial decision making. Professor Sheldon reviews the purposes
served by dissenting opinions. He also notes that a concurrence may suggest a higher
level of dissonance because the concurring justice disagrees with the majority's
reasoning, the heart of judicial decision making. The level of cohesion for each
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Sheldon begins by outlining the biographies of different
members of the supreme court. He then discusses the behavior
of several representative courts in order to measure the
influence of the various factors he has identified. Specifically,
he analyzes the supreme court in 1903-04, the 1920s, 1939-40,
the 1950s, and 1979-80.30
First, judicial decision making is affected by an individual
justice's roles and values. Sheldon identifies two broad roles:
judicial restraint and judicial activism. A justice who practices
restraint attempts to preserve accountability by deferring to
policies established by the executive and the legislature, the
two branches of government perceived as most accountable to
the public. A justice who practices activism believes that the
court is ultimately responsible to a more abstract concept of
the rule of law. Such justices, on the basis of their authority
and training, would change established policy if they believed
that it was best for the community.
Individual justices are also influenced by their adherence
to one of two competing value systems. Justices who espouse
conservative values believe that the state should keep
opportunities open and the rules of competition fair.
Conversely, justices who are liberal believe that the state must
actively intervene to protect individuals from governmental
abuse and to enable individuals to compete fairly in the
economic and social spheres. However, the individual jurist
must adapt to a system of collective action.
Because a
majority of the court is required to reach a decision, individual
justices must adjust their roles and values to allow a
consensus.

31

Second, judicial decision making has been affected by the
representative court is measured by the number of dissenting and concurring opinions
filed. Id. at 246-51 (Table 10.3).
Equilibrium is defined as legitimated power, the recognition or acceptance of the
court's right to exercise its authority. Professor Sheldon measures the equilibrium of
each representative court in several ways. First, he compares the number of

subsequent, favorable citations. Second, he examines the number of citations in
American Law Reports. Third, he considers the results of cases appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. Fourth, he compiles the number of law review references to

particular cases. Id. at 251-53 (Table 10.4).
30. Professor Sheldon used three standards in selecting these representative
courts and in compiling data from them. First, he chose years in which little or no
change occurred in the membership of the court. Second, the judges were products of
the recruitment process typical during those years. Third, data were collected for a
two-year span, which was the middle period for these courts. Id. at 244.

31. Id. at 336.

1989]

A Century of Judging

333

types of legal questions that the supreme court has been asked
to decide. There has been a progression from predominantly
common law development to primarily statutory interpretation
and an increase in the number of cases decided by the federal
courts and by administrative agencies. Most of the court's
early cases involved debt collection, corporations, contracts,
and real property. The litigants were private individuals.
Gradually, torts, public law, and criminal law questions became
the more common areas of dispute. Accordingly, the public
sector produced an increasing number of litigants. Sheldon
concludes that because of these changes, the supreme court
was increasingly involved in public policy issues.32
Third, judicial decision making has been influenced by
institutional changes. For example, the original court was
composed of five justices, but, in 1901, the number was
temporarily increased to seven. This temporary increase
became permanent in 1905, and by 1909, nine justices sat on
the court. Gradually, the authority of the chief justice
increased. In 1925, the Judicial Council was created to provide
the court with advice and to allow it to experiment with
changes to the decisional process through court rulemaking
rather than through more permanent legislation. The bar
association began to participate in lawyer admission and
discipline procedures as well.
Other significant institutional changes included the
employment of law clerks, the creation of an administrative
office, and the use of pro tempore judges. The most critical
change arising from among the Judicial Council's proposals
occurred in 1968 when a new, intermediate appellate court was
created. 3 ' By 1983, almost all appeals from the court of appeals
to the supreme court were discretionary.
Sheldon's methodology is well-illustrated by his analysis of
the 1979-80 court, which represents the modern period. 34 This
court is also the most interesting because Sheldon was able to
32. Id. at 230-39 (Tables 9.2 & 9.5).
33. Id. at 229. The Council proposed a number of reforms including creating an
intermediate court of appeals, using commissioners, limiting the right of appeal in
certain cases, and reducing the number of cases in which opinions were written.
34. This period may be most interesting because Professor Sheldon has more
detailed information about it. His results are based on extensive surveys, interviews,
and correspondence with members of the court and on surveys of law clerks for this
and other periods. Id. at 309 n.4, 313 n.12. In addition, Professor Sheldon uses statistics
compiled by the administrator for the courts office. Id. at 310 n.6.
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interview a number of the justices and their law clerks. As a
result, the reader learns some of the justices' personal views
about how the court functions. In keeping with his model of
multiple factors, Sheldon discusses the recruitment method for
each justice, offers short biographies for some of the justices,
and describes the institutional changes in effect during their
tenure.
Following the theory that all of these forces must be
properly balanced, Sheldon measures this court's effectiveness,
cohesiveness, and equilibrium. These factors are assessed by
evaluating the number of dissenting and concurring opinions
and by discussing several of the justices' views about the
functions served by these opinions.3" Sheldon also measures
the interplay between the justices' requisite collective action
and their individual roles and values. In looking at the effect
of collective action, Sheldon traces the court's internal
procedures from the time a case is accepted for review to the
time a decision is rendered. In order to assess the influence of
each individual justice's roles and values, Sheldon creates
several graphs. These graphs locate each justice along activerestraint and conservative-liberal axes. 36 They then chart
interagreement percentages, defined as the number of times
individual justices agreed with other specific justices. 37 The
interagreement percentages should be higher for justices who
shared the same values and roles. Unfortunately, the graphs do
not bear out the theory.

35. Id. at 316-17 (Tables 15.5 & 15.6).
36. Id. at 321 (Fig. 15.1).
37. Id. at 321 (Table 15.7).
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Table 15.5
Dissonance Rate: Court 5 (yearly average)
Concurring
Dissenting Dissenting OpinionsVotes
Votes
Opinions

Judge
Rosellini
Dolliver.
Brachtenbach
Utter
Stafford
Hicks
Wright
Horowitz
Williams
Total
Average/Judge

ST

10.0
14.5
4.0
6.5
5.0
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.0

8.0
6.5
14.0
9.5
6.0
11.0
11.5
12.0
3.0

8.0
4.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
6.0
4.5
3.0
5.5

49.5
5.5

81.5
9.0

55.0
6.1

Total
Disagreements
26.0
25.0
25.0
24.0
20.0
19.5
18.5
17.5
10.5

(13.9%)
(13.4%)
(13.4%)
(13.4%)
(10.7%)
(10.4%)
(9.9%)
(9.4%)
(5.6%)

186.0 (100.0%)
20.6
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Fig. 15.1. Philosophical positions ofjudges on Court 5 (Source: Survey of
former law clerks and appellate attorneys)
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Table 15.7
Interagreement Percentages: Court 5

Z
E~

-

0

Horowitz
Utter

81

]

Dolliver
Williams
Brachtenbach
Hicks
Wright
Stafford

59
57

W

-

-

58
58

51
45

48
50

51
32

49
43

39
34

53

50
49

49
70
51

43
51
54
51

39
58
50
50
51

42
58
47
50
64
43

Court average: 50.7%
Sprague criterion: 74.6%

Sheldon concludes that, although the court's authority had
increased, the dissonance level of the 1979-80 court was higher
than for any other court that he studied." One major reason
for this difference may have been that the court was now
hearing cases involving more contentious issues, issues that
had already divided the court of appeals. The court was also
involved in the civil rights and criminal procedure revolution
begun by the United States Supreme Court. In addition, the
court's role in shaping public policy was a more accepted idea,
so there was a corresponding increase in cases raising such
issues.3 9

Ultimately, the answer to the second question posed in A
CENTURY OF JUDGING is as unsatisfying as the answer to the
first question. The book does not really show how recruitment
methods have influenced the decision making of individual
jurists. The book also fails to demonstrate the tensions
between public accountability and judicial independence. In
the same way, the book does not show how any of these
multiple factors, alone or in combination, have affected
decision making. There is no clear correlation between a
justice's personal background and beliefs and the way that the
same justice will decide a particular legal question. There is no
38. Id. at 317 (Table 15.5).
39. Id. at 315-16, 333-34.
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basis for predicting that justices who share the same roles and
values will agree on the result in a particular case. Finally,
there is no obvious relationship between institutional or
historical changes and the resulting judicial decision making
for that period.
A CENTURY OF JUDGING provides an exhaustive
compilation of facts regarding the multiple forces that might
affect judicial decision making. The book is also a valuable
historical record. The analytical techniques result in
interesting statistics and comparisons. However, the facts do
not prove the theories. For example, the conflicting forces that
influence the judicial recruitment process are carefully
surveyed, but the tension between public accountability and
judicial independence is never fully addressed. Similarly,
although the correlations among individual factors, the needs
of group dynamics, and the influence of changing structural
factors are compiled, the court's decision-making process is no
more predictable than before.
Perhaps it is merely a matter of expectation. Generally, a
court's decision-making process is analyzed by studying its
opinions. A CENTURY OF JUDGING does not analyze court
opinions. Instead, it introduces the techniques of political
science to describe the multiple tensions bearing on the
justices who make decisions. These multiple forces have been
thoroughly identified and examined; however, the theories
need further development.

